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NOTES
THE BURDEN OF PROOF REQUIRED OF A PARENT
CLAIMING CHILD EXEMPTION
One of the most common recurring tax problems which arises follow-
ing the dissolution of marriage' relates to the determination of which
parent is entitled to claim a dependency exemption 2 for minor children of
the marriage.3 Although the exemption is normally allowed to the cus-
todial parent, 4 difficult problems are presented where the non-custodial
parent seeks to claim the exemption based on the fact that he' paid $1200
or more for the support of such children. Questions arise as to which
parent has the burden of proof, and what standard of proof is required in
order to substantiate.the claim.'
The determination as to which parent satisfies the support test for the
dependency exemption under section 152(e) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954 may have broad consequences. The classification of a child as a
dependent under section 152 is essential in order for a parent to claim
deductions of medical and dental expenses under section 213, 7 and for
child care expenses under section 214.8 Consequently, a favorable determi-
nation is particularly important for the father without custody who has
defrayed large hospital bills for his child, 9 and for the mother with custody
'The Internal Revenue Service estimated that during a recent year, 5 percent of all
income tax cases handled at the informal conference level of the administrative process
involved child dependency claims as the principal issue. H.R. REP. No. 102, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1967), reprinted in 1967-2 Cum. BULL. 590, 592 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT].
Irr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 151(e) authorizes an exemption of $650 per dependent for
taxable years beginning January 1, 197 1, and $700 per dependent for taxable years beginning
January 1, 1972 and thereafter. If passed by Congress, the Revenue Bill of 1971, H.R. 10947,
92d Cong., Ist Sess. (197 1), will increase the value of the dependency exemption to $675 for
197 1, with a further increase to $750 after 197 1.
'The determination of which parent is entitled to the dependency exemption under
section 152(e) has no bearing on "head of household" status. Thus, the custodial parent
may not qualify for the dependency exemption, but that parent may still qualify for the
favonrable "head of household" tax rates under section l(b) as long as the taxpayer at the
close of his taxable year is not married, is not a surviving spouse, and maintains his home
as the principal place of abode for a son or daughter. INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2(b)(1).
'INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(1).
'For semantic convenience, the father will be treated as the non-custodial parent.
'There may be problems as to what items constitute support, but consideration of such
aspects is beyond the scope of this note. See Glassberg, Who Is a Dependent and How to
Support Him Taxwise, N.Y.U. 26TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 1 (1968); 5 J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCoME TAXATION § 32.14d (rev. vol. 1969).
7INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 213(a)(1).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 214(a), (d)(1).
'The father, as non-custodial parent, may seek to avoid problems related to deductibil-
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who has paid considerable sums for child care in order that she might
work.
Prior to 1967, the tax exemption was allowed to the parent who fur-
nished more than half of the total support of the child. 0 In order to qualify
for the exemption, the parent had the burden of proving not only the
amount of support he had given the child, but also the total amount of
support provided from all sources. The task could be rendered difficult
and often impossible for the parent not having custody by the refusal of
the other parent to furnish figures on the child's total cost of support."
In response to the administrative problems created by the patent unfair-
ness of the law,' 2 Congress in 1967 passed a new law applicable to years
beginning after 1966.'
3
THE EFFECT OF THE 1967 AMENDMENT UPON THE SUPPORT TEST
As under the prior law, the exemption will be granted to the parent
who provides the greater amount of support for the minor children." It
is no longer necessary, however, for the taxpayer to prove he provided over
half the total support for the dependent. Presently, as long as the child
receives over half of his total support from the combined expenditures of
his parents,' 5 the parent who provides the larger portion will qualify for
the dependency exemption. 6
An additional purpose of the new legislation is to provide each parent
with information as to the other parent's contributions to support. 7 This
ity of child support by including such support in alimony payments without designation as
child support. Under this arrangement, the full sum is deductible by the father and is income
to the mother. Treas. Reg. § 1.7 1-1(e) (1957).
'0T.D. 6231, 1957-1 Cui. BULL. 77 provides in part:
For purposes of the income taxes imposed on individuals by the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, the term "dependent" means any individual de-
scribed in . . . section 152(a) over half of whose support, for the calendar
year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins, was received from
the taxpayer.
Id. at 83.
"In Robert I. Brown, 48 T.C. 42 (1967), the taxpayer was denied the exemption due to
his failure to prove total support. The court noted: "[Wle are constrained to comment that
the ends of justice are not served by the present situation and to express our hope that...
ameliorating legislation will be enacted." 48 T.C. at 44.
"HousE REPORT, supra note 1, at 591.
"3Act of Aug. 31, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-78, H.R. 6056, amending INT. REV. CODE OF
1954 § 152(e).
4
1NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e).
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(l)(A).
I'Thus, under the present law, should the combined expenditures of the parents equal
5 1 % of the child's total support, then the exemption would be granted to the parent who
paid the greater amount of support, or as little as 26% of the child's total support.
"In the event that both parents intend to or actually do claim a child as a dependent,
Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(e) (1971) provides that each parent must deliver to the other parent
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exchange of information serves to prepare the ground for an early admin-
istrative disposition should both parents assert conflicting exemption
claims. 8 Moreover, in the event of litigation, the parent petitioning for
the child exemption is able to prepare his case in advance. At trial, the
petitioner will thus be able to attack any amounts claimed by the other
parent which he believes to have been improperly attributed to support.
The new provisions are stated in terms of a number of statutory
presumptions. 9 The general rule of section 152(e) provides that the parent
or to an internal revenue officer an itemized statement upon which each parent's claim is
based. The statement must list the amounts expended for medical and dental care, food,
shelter, clothing, education, recreation and transportation, and the total amount of support
furnished the child. The regulation provides that if the required statement is not furnished
pursuant to the instructions of the internal revenue officer, the claim of support of the parent
failing to comply with such requirement may be disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service.
1T'he Internal Revenue Service's procedure in isolating conflicting exemption claims is
generally dependent upon the segregation of 1040 forms which indicate that a claimed
dependent is not living with the taxpayer. If an agent audits the father's return, he will, as a
matter of course, inquire as to the location of the dependents and will obtain the mother's
return from the service center with which the mother filed her return. The agent will compare
the two forms to determine whether both taxpayers are claiming the same dependents. If
both are in fact claiming the same dependents, the agent will normally seek an agreement
wherein duplication of the exemptions is eliminated. If that fails, the Internal Revenue
Service generally will disallow both claims. Lettez from Moshe Schuldinger, Director of the
Tax Legislation Division of the Treasury Department, to the Washington & Lee Law
Review, Oct. 22, 1971, on file in Washington & Lee Law Library.
Ir. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e) provides:
(1) General Rule.-lf-
(A) a child (as defined in section 151 (e)(3)) receives over
half of his support during the calendar year from his parents
who are divorced or legally separated under a decree of divorce
or separate maintenance, or who are separated under a written
separation agreement, and
(B) such child is in the custody of one or both of his
parents for more than one-half of the calendar year, such child
shall be treated, for purposes of subsection (a), as receiving over
half of his support during the calendar year from the parent
having custody for a greater portion of the calendar year unless
he is treated, under the provisions of paragraph (2), as having
received over half of his support for such year from the other
parent (referred to in this subsection as the parent not having
custody).
(2) Special Rule.-The child of parents described in paragraph (1)
shall be treated as having received over half his support during the calendar
year from the parent not having custody if-
(A)(i) the decree of divorce or of separate maintenance, or
a written agreement between the parents applicable to the taxa-
ble year beginning in such calendar year, provides that the par-
ent not having custody shall be entitled to any deduction allowa-
ble under section 151 for such child, and
1972]
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with custody of the child shall be treated as having given over half of the
child's support for the purposes of the dependency exemption."0 There are
two exceptions to the general rule: the first allows the exemption to the
non-custodial parent if a decree of divorce or separation, or a written
agreement between the parents, assigns the deduction to the non-custodial
parent, and that parent contributes a minimum of $600 annual support
per child;"' the second exception provides that if the parent not having
custody supplies $1200 or more for support of the child, the burden of
producing evidence is shifted,22 and the exemption is conferred on the non-
custodial parent. Nevertheless, if the parent having custody can clearly
(ii) such parent not having custody provides at least
$600 for the support of such child during the calendar year, or
(B)(i) the parent not having custody provides $1,200 or
more for the support of such child (or if there is more than one
such child, $1,200 or more for all of such children) for the
calendar year, and
(ii) the parent having custody of such child does not
clearly establish that he provided more for the support of such
child during the calendar year than the parent not having cus-
tody.
For the purposes of this paragraph, amounts expended for the
support of a child or children shall be treated as received from
the parent not having custody to the extent that such parent
provided amounts for such support.
(3) Itemized statement required.-If a taxpayer claims that para-
graph (2)(B) applies with respect to a child for a calendar year and the
other parent claims that paragraph (2)(B)(i) is not satisfied or claims to
have provided more for the support of such child during such calendar year
than the taxpayer, each parent shall be entitled to receive, under regula-
tions to be prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, an itemized state-
ment of the expenditures upon which the other parent's claim of support
is based.
(4) Exception for multiple-support agreement.-The provisions of
this subsection shall not apply in any case where over half of the support
of the child is treated as having been received from a taxpayer under the
provisions of subsection (c).
"INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(1).
211NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(2)(A).
22The statutory presumptions of section 152(e) might be termed "counter-
presumptions." For example, the general rule which provides that the parent with custody
shall be treated as having given over half of the child's support has the effect of placing upon
the non-custodial parent the burden of establishing the nonexistence of that fact. That is,
the burden of going forward with the evidence rests upon the non-custodial parent. However,
he may overcome that presumption by producing contrary evidence; if by his evidence he
establishes that he provided $1200 or more for support, he shall succeed in creating another
presumption which now imposes the same duty on the custodial parent, who may in turn
be able to dispose of it satisfactorily. See, e.g., 9 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2493 (3d ed. 1940).
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establish that she in fact provided more support than the parent not
having custody, she will be entitled to the dependency exemption.?
The effect of the presumption under sectibn 152(e) will vary depending
upon the context in which it is asserted. Prior to litigation, the rules serve
to facilitate disposition of the issue at the administrative level z* by deter-
mining which parent bears the risk of non-persuasion and the burden of
producing evidence. However, if administrative attempts to settle the issue
fail and the question goes to court, the petitioner bears the burden of
proof, i.e. the risk of non-persuasion, regardless of which parent has
benefit of the.presumption.25 At trial, the effect of the presumption is to
determine which party has the burden of producing evidence, and the level
of proof required in order to substantiate claimed expenditures.
Forexample, in the event that the mother petitions the Tax Court for
a determination that she may claim her children as dependents, she would
have the burden of establishing that she spent more for the support of the
children than did her former husband. As petitioner, she bears the burden
of proof from the start; under no circumstances does the risk of non-
persuasion shift to the Commissioner. Generally, the Internal Revenue
Service, as respondent, will rely upon the testimony of the father either
as witness or by affidavit to establish that he provided his claimed expen-
ditures in support of the dependents, and that the mother did not exceed
that amount.26 If the father's expenditures fall below $1200, then the
mother must prove by only a mere preponderance of the evidence that her
expenditures exceeded those of her former husband.2? On the other hand,
2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2'The court in Allen F. Labay, 55 T.C. No. 2 (Oct. 5, 1970), stated:
We think section 152(e)(2)(B) was not designed primarily with litigation
in mind, but rather to provide rules to facilitate the administrative disposi-
tion by the Internal Revenue Service of dependency exemptions claimed
for children of divorced parents. Congress obviously wanted to encourage
the finality of administrative action taken by the Commissioner in such
disputes.
55 T.C. at 11.
"The issue is determined in an adversary proceeding between petitioner (the parent
claiming the exemption) and the Commissioner (respondent). Rule 32 of Rules of Practice
of the Tax Court provides:
The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise
provided by statute, and except that in respect of any new matter pleaded
in his answer, it shall be upon the respondent.
T.C.R. PRAC. 32.
2Letter from Moshe Schuldinger, supra note 18.
1ln Marjorie F. Ford, P-H TAx CT. MEI. DEc. 71-255 (Sep. 30, 1971), the depend-
ency exemption was allowed the custodial mother. The father, as witness for the Commis-
sioner, was unable to prove he contributed S 1200 which would have raised the level of proof
required of the mother.
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if the father as non-custodial parent proves support in excess of $1200,
then the presumption of section 152(e)(2)(B) comes into effect raising the
mother's required level of proof to a higher standard, i.e. a clear prepon-
derance of the evidence.
THE POSSIBILITY OF DOUBLE EXEMPTIONS AND THE USE OF THIRD PARTY
PRACTICE PROVISIONS AS A REMEDY
In view of the fact that only one of the parents is an actual party to
the Tax Court proceeding,"8 it is entirely possible under present law for
both parents to qualify for the dependency exemption for the same chil-
dren. The converse, whereby neither would qualify, is also possible. 29 For
instance, in the event that the mother residing in Virginia is granted the
exemption by the Tax Court, the father, living in Illinois, is nevertheless
free to institute a refund action in the federal district court or the Court
of Claims asserting that he should be allowed the exemption for his child."
Since he was not a party to the Tax Court action, the doctrine of collateral
estoppel would not prevent him from making such an assertion.3 1 If the
court accepts his position, he can recover even though the mother has been
upheld in the Tax Court action. Thus, both parents may qualify for the
dependency exemption for the same child.
A possible solution to this dilemma lies in bringing both parents before
the court as parties in the same action whenever possible. This may be
accomplished by varying means depending upon whether a parent brings
2Of fourteen cases decided by the Tax Court applying section 152(e), only one involved
joinder of both parents' claims before the same court. Herbert Wieder, P-H TAX. CT. MEM.
DEC. 71-246 (Sep. 27, 1971).
29Louis Adler, 19 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 545 (1950). Petitioner's former wife had
previously been denied exemptions for her two children since she had failed to prove payment
of over one half of their support. In this action, the husband was denied the exemptions for
the same reason although, admittedly, both parents had contributed the full support of the
children.
-28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1970) gives federal district courts and the Court of Claims
concurrent original jurisdiction of any civil action against the United States for recovery of
illegally assessed or collected internal revenue tax.
31RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Explanatory Notes § 93, comment b at 463-64 (1942)
provides:
The parties to a valid personal judgment are concluded by findings of law
or of fact upon litigated issues . . . . These findings do not, however,
affect persons who are not parties or privies to the action and the judgment
.... This is true although such persons were . . . witnesses or partici-
pated in a representative capacity for the benefit of one of the parties. They
are not bound by the determination. . ..
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the action before the federal district court, the Court of Claims, 32 or the
Tax Court.
In the event that both parents bring separate claims before the same
court, the actions may be consolidated in a single trial. The federal district
courts have authority to consolidate under Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.3 The Court of Claims has the same power under Rule
131(a) of the Rules of the Court of Claims.Y Although there is no similar
rule applying to actions pending before the Tax Court, consolidation for
purposes of trial has been permitted in a recent case regarding conflicting
claims of parents for the dependency exemption.3
If the parents bring separate actions before the Tax Court and the
federal district court respectively, the Government as defendant in the
district court proceeding may implead the other parent as a third-party
defendant.3 6 Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure3 7 author-
izes the defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, to cause a summons
"ln the situation where one parent brings a suit for refund before the Court of Claims,
rule 41 of the Rules of the United States Court of Claims authorizes the court to summon
any third person against whom the United States may be asserting a claim or contingent
claim in respect of the issue which constitutes the subject matter of the suit. Rule 62 of the
Rules of the Court of Claims also provides that persons having a joint interest adverse to
the United States shall be made parties and joined on the same side as plaintiffs or, if need
be, made involuntary plaintiffs.
3FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a) provides:
(a) Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of
any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
"Rule 131 (a) of the Rules of the Court of Claims provides:
(a) Consolidation: When actions involving a common question of law or
fact are pending, the commissioner may order a joint trial of any or all
the matters in issue in the actions, or he may order the actions consoli-
dated, or he may make such other orders concerning the proceedings
therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
U.S. CT. CL. R. 131.
2Herbert Weider, P-H TAX CT. MEM. DEC. 71-246 (Sep. 27, 1971). For a discussion
on consolidations before the Tax Court see 2 CASEY, FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE § 7.37 (1955).
"As an alternative measure, rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes
joinder of a person if he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action. In addition,
he must be so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double or inconsistent
obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
3FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in part:
(a) At any time after commencement of the action a defending party. as
a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him.
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and complaint to be served upon a person who is or may be liable to him
for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him. Indeed, there have been
a number of suits against the Government by taxpayers for refunds in
which the courts have allowed impleader when the underlying purpose of
the procedure, the avoidance of circuity of actions, would be furthered by
bringing in a third party.38
Jurisdiction over the third-party defendant must be obtained in ac-
cordance with Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 9 In the case
where the Government as defendant in an Illinois refund action seeks to
implead a Virginia resident, Rule 4(e) authorizes service of process upon
a party not found within the state whenever a statute of the forum state
so provides. Illinois' long arm statute, like those of a number of states,
has been construed to encompass the area of domestic relations."
For purposes of federal jurisdiction and venue, the claim by the
Government against the non-resident parent is treated as ancillary so that
there need be no independent jurisdictional basis to support the claim, and
venue requirements for an independent action need not be met.',
Any decision rendered by one court involving the same parties, facts,
and law at a time that an action is pending in another court is resjudicata
as to those issues and parties. For example, in I. Balanovski,2 a Tax
"ln Crompton-Richmond Co., Factors v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 219 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), the government had assessed and collected a penalty against a corporation for failure
to pay over withheld taxes. In a refund action, the United States was allowed to implead
four officers of the corporation under rule 14(a) on the ground that one or more or all of
them might be liable to defendant for all or part of plaintiffs claim against the defendant.
The court stated, "While the addition of new parties may, of course, add somewhat to the
length and complexity of discovery procedures, the price is small compared to the alternative
prospect of separate, largely repetitious, and potentially inconsistent adjudications." 273 F.
Supp. at 221. Accord, Wilkie v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Tex. 1968); Dunham
v. United States, 42 F.R.D. 169 (D. Conn. 1967); Gardner v. United States, 36 F.R.D. 453
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
39As to residents of the forum state, rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
authorizes service of process anywhere within the territorial limits of the forum state, and
with regard to non-domiciliaries, at all places outside the state but not more than 100 miles
from the place in which the action is commenced.
"See Note, Domestic Relations: The Role of Long Arm Statutes, 10 WASHBURN L.J.
487 (1971). See also Friedman, Extension of the Illinois Long Arm Statute: Divorce and
Separate Maintenance, 16 DEPAUL L. Rev. 45 (1967).
4 in construing rule 14(a), the court in United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 347 U.S. 975 (1954), commented:
While the question is not free from doubt, we are of the opinion that the
reasons which give the court jurisdiction over an ancillary proceeding by
virtue of its jurisdiction over the principal action, likewise support the
conclusion that venue in the ancillary proceeding may depend or rest upon
the venue in the main proceeding.
209 F.2d at 714.
"128 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 197 (1959).
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Court action was put on the reserve calendar while a case involving the
same issues and parties was decided in the Court of Claims. When an
unfavorable decision was returned against the petitioner in the Court of
Claims, he sought to revive his claim in the Tax Court. The Tax Court
held, however, that the issue was res judicata and that he was bound by
the decision in the Court of Claims.
43
THE SECOND EXCEPTION AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
The House Reports44 do not disclose the policy reasons which guided
the drafters of the legislation in setting that expenditure level which shifts
the burden of producing evidence to the custodial parent. In fixing the
figure at $1200, they may have been influenced by the fact that while the
husband is required to make a cash contribution for the support of his
minor children, the wife, who in most cases retains custody, contributes
her personal services. The value of personal services, however, may not
be included in computing support expenditures. 5
Nevertheless, the provision which confers the presumption upon the
noncustodial parent may have arbitrary results. The burden of producing
evidence is shifted upon payment of $1200 towards child support, whether
the amount is for one child or several. 6 Thus, as the number of children
involved increases, the per capita contribution required to shift the burden
of producing evidence decreases. For example: I child-$1200; 2 chil-
dren-$600; 3 children-$400; 4 children-$300; etc. This provision ap-
pears somewhat inconsistent with the first exception which requires a
minimum expenditure of $600 -per child by the parent without custody.
47
'There remains, however, one situation where both or neither of the parents may receive
the dependency exemption. In the event that the mother (or the father) brings an action
before the Tax Court, and the father pays the tax but delays in bringing the suit for refund
until the mother's case has been decided, then the possibility exists that either the Govern-
ment or the taxpayers would receive inconsistent obligations. Since the Tax Court has no
rules authorizing joinder of third parties, it is not possible in this example to join both
parents in the same proceeding.
"See note I supra.
"5E.g., Frank Markarian, 42 T.C. 640 (1964), affd 352 F.2d 870 (7th Cir. 1965). In
the appellate opinion, the court said:
It is true that the present regulation [Treas. Reg. § 1.15 2 -I(a)(2)(i)] con-
tains elements of unfairness. For example, those who can afford to or do
pay for the care of a dependent may include their expenses in computing
the support furnished, while those who, because of necessity or for other
reasons, personally furnish identical services may not include the fair mar-
ket value of such services. This unfairness, however, must be balanced
against the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of determining fairly the
value of such services and of deciding what services constitute support.
352 F.2d at 873.
'
8
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(2)(B)(i).
7IIIr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(2)(A)(ii).
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In any case, regardless of the per capita contribution, the burden is placed
upon the custodial parent to "clearly establish" that she in fact paid more
in child support than he.4" The harshness of this exception created by the
arbitrary level of support expenditure will depend to a large extent upon
the degree of proof required in order to overcome the presumption.
THE STANDARD OF PROOF CONTROVERSY
The meaning of the phrase "clearly establish"49 and the degree of
proof required to rebut the presumption in the second exception favoring
the noncustodial parent has been the subject of recent controversy. In
Allen F. Labay,5' the petitioner, having provided over $1200 in child
support in 1967, sought deductions for dependency exemptions for his two
minor children in the custody of his former wife. The Internal Revenue
Service denied the claim deductions on the basis that his former wife had
provided more support. At the trial, she, as respondent's witness, was able
to produce groups of checks to substantiate many of the support items to
which she testified; 5' however, she could give no more than estimates on
a few support items which were unsubstantiated by checks in hand. She
also had difficulty in identifying certain checks as representing specific
expenditures for a particular child. Consequently, the question of whether
the petitioner's former wife had provided over half of the children's sup-
port depended upon the court's acceptance or rejection of her estimates.
52
The court accepted her calculations and held that she had provided a
greater amount for the children's support than the petitioner.
5 3
In reaching this result, the Tax Court was forced to ascertain the
statutory meaning of "clearly establish." 54 Although the court looked
initially to the legislative history, it rejected the interpretation suggested
by the House Committee Reports, which state:
[T]he parent having custody remains entitled to the deduction with
respect to a particular child, if he establishes that he, in fact,
"8INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 152(e)(2)(B)(ii).
491d.
1055 T.C. No. 2 (Oct. 5, 1970), affd, No. 71-1224 (5th Cir. Nov. 2, 1971).
"Petitioner's former wife had been employed by the Internal Revenue Service during
the years of 1966 and 1967 as a taxpayer's representative. Part of her job consisted of
advising taxpayers as to what documents might be required of them to substantiate claimed
deductions.
521Nr. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 274(d), which denies deductions for certain unsubstan-
tiated expenditures, is directed specifically at business expenses under sections 162 and 212,
and not at the support test under section 152(e).
155 T.C. at 14.
55 T.C. at 13.
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furnished a greater portion of that child's support than did the
parent not having custody, but only if he establishes this fact by
clear and convincing evidence.--
The court was dissatisfied with the "clear and convincing"56 standard
because it demanded from the custodial parent the sort of strong proof
required of the Internal Revenue Service in civil tax fraud cases. 57 The
unjustness of such a standard was evident in that it might be virtually
impossible for the custodial parent to keep documentary records of many
kinds of child support expenditures.-" The Labay court acknowledged that
proof in dependency exemption cases does not lend itself to precision or
exactness,-9 and to impose upon the Commissioner (and indirectly upon
the parent having custody) such an extraordinary burden would defeat the
general rule that the parent with custody should have the exemption. The
court resolved this dilemma in favor of the custodial parent. It held that
the common import of the words "clearly establish" requires only that it
be shown by a clear preponderance0 of the evidence that the parent having
custody of the children provided a greater amount for their support than
the parent not having custody. The court reasoned that any other con-
struction would be impractical and at variance with the general policy of
the statute as a whole.
In dissenting, Judge Irwin was joined by five other members of the Tax
Court in arguing that Congress had made its intention apparent that
"clear and convincing" was the proper evidentiary standard to be ap-
plied.6 The underlying policy behind such a heavy burden, he stated, was
that the parent with custody is in a far better position to furnish informa-
OHOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 592 (emphasis added).
Wr6he dissent, relying on Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 499, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954),
defined "clear and convincing" evidence as:
[T]hat measure or degree of proof which will produce in the mind of the
trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations sought to be
established. It is intermediate, being more than a mere preponderance, but
not to the extent of such certainty as is required beyond a reasonable doubt
as in criminal cases.
55 T.C. at 16.
"E.g., Henry S. Kerbaugh, 29 B.T.A. 1014, affd 74 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1935); cf. 9 J.
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.67, n.70 (rev. vol. 1965).
"ltems such as food and entertainment are often cash expenses which are not easily
substantiated; indeed, the fair rental value of lodging is necessarily an estimate. E.g., Emil
Blarek, 23 T.C. 1037 (1955); Treas. Reg. § 1.152-1(a)(2)(i) (1971).
-155 T.C. at 13.
0'The court defined "clear preponderance" of the evidence as "[s]omething more posi-
tive and explicit, as opposed to inferences to be drawn from ambiguous and equivocal
proof." 55 T.C. at 13.
6155 T.C. at 14.
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tion as to the total support of the children. The dissent concluded that "if
• . .the requirement of 'clear and convincing' evidence, which Congress
states is meant by 'clearly establish,' leads to harsh . . . results, it is the
• . .function of Congress. . .to redefine it."
'62
Inasmuch as section 152(e)(2)(B) applies only to claimed dependency
exemptions after 1966,63 Labay was a case of first impression before the
Tax Court applying the 1967 amendment. Those cases which have since
discussed the support test have uniformly applied the Labay court's stan-
dard of "clear preponderance." 4 However, several cases have applied the
support test but avoided any discussion of the meaning of "clearly estab-
lish."6  Adding to the confusion, the Treasury on March 20, 1971,
adopted new regulations amplifying section 152(e).16 These regulations
defined the standard of proof required by the custodial parent in terms of
the "clear and convincing" standard previously repudiated by the Tax
Court.
At this time, it appears that the Internal Revenue Service is willing to
accept the Labay rationale. On August 17, 1971, the Treasury proposed
to amend paragraph (d)(3) of section 1.152-4 of the Regulations to replace
the "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard with "clear preponder-
ance."' '67 The proposal became law on October 12, 1971.68 The apparent
result of this change is to resolve the ambiguity surrounding the support
test in favor of a lower evidentiary standard.
USE OF ESTIMATES IN PROOF OF SUPPORT WHEN DOCUMENTED PROOF
HAS NOT BEEN AVAILABLE
Proof of support items such as food, shelter, clothing, medical and
dental care, education, recreation, and the like does not always lend itself
to precision and exactness. When documented evidence has not been avail-
able, the petitioner has had to resort to the use of estimates with frequently
6255 T.C. at 16.
OTreas. Reg. § 1.152-4(a) (1971).
"Richard M. Blake, P-H TAX CT. MENI. DEC. 71-189 (Aug. 3, 1971); Elsie Bush
Richardson, P-H TAX CT. MEM. DEC. 71-100 (May 10, 1971); John S. Robinson, P-H
TAX CT. MEM. DEC. 71-078 (Apr. 21, 1971); Aron Alvin Holley, P-H TAX CT. MEN1.
DEC. 71-064 (Apr. 7, 1971).
"Elwood J. Muldoon, P-H TAX CT. MEm. DEC. 71-213 (Aug. 25, 1971); Richard
D. Stanton, P-H TAX CT. MEM. DEC. 71-202 (Aug. 18, 1971); Betty Clarice Bosher, P-
H TAX CT. MEM. DEC. 71-061 (Apr. 5, 1971); Donna Jo Campbell, P-H TAX CT. MENI.
DEC. 71-051 (Mar. 25, 1971).
"Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4(d)(3), T.D. 7099 (1971), INT. REv. BULL. No. 16, at 10.
u7ld.
18T.D. 7145, cited at 36 FED. REG. 20039 (1971).
NOTES
unsuccessful results. Over the years, no obvious pattern of consistency has
evolved in the Tax Court as to the use of estimates in proof of support.
In E.R. Cobb, 9 a case arising under the pre-1967 legislation, the
taxpayer was unable to establish the precise amount which his former wife
had contributed to the support of their two children. However, his evid-
ence as to her income and the manner in which she lived was sufficient to
convince the court that he had furnished more than half the cost of the
two children's support.
The taxpayer in Bernard C. Rivers7 was faced with a similar problem
in proving total support. He contended that under the rationale of Cohan
v. Commissioner7l the court might estimate his wife's expenditures and
thus arrive at a figure for total support. The court denied his request and
held:
We are not at liberty to do as petitioner contends. The burden is
upon him to establish clearly his right to the dependency exemp-
tions. No factor relating to his right to such exemptions is here
disputed except the crucial factor which is the total amount ex-
pended from all sources for the support of [the children] during the
year . . . Cohan does not authorize or require a conjecture by
this court as to that total amount.
72
Thus, estimates have been disfavored by the Tax Court as proof of sup-
port in child dependency cases.
In Commissioner v. Mendel,73 the taxpayer testified as to his own
substantial contributions toward support but was unable to obtain ex-
pense information from his wife. He did establish that his children had
not been seriously ill, and that they had attended public school and dressed
modestly. Nevertheless, the Tax Court, reaffirming its holding in Rivers,
refused to accept the taxpayer's estimates. On appeal, however, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and granted petitioner the exemp-
tions, holding that he had sustained his burden of proof as to support.
Most recently, the Tax Court allowed the inference of the Cohan
principle in a case which followed the Labay interpretation of the support
test. The petitioner, the custodial parent in Elsie Bush Richardson,74 was
6928 T.C. 595 (1957).
7033 T.C. 935 (1960).
7139 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930). Here, the court held that once a taxpayer's right to a
deduction was established, the amount of the deduction could be determined by approxima-
tion.
7233 T.C. at 937-38.
73351 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1965).
74P-H TAX CT. MEm. DEC. 71-100 (May 10, 1971).
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unable to offer documentary evidence as to her expenditures in clothing
her three children.7 5 Rather than deny the full amount of the claimed
expenditures, the Tax Court allowed amounts which paralleled United
States Department of Agriculture statistics on the cost of raising a child
in the South in 1967.76
The implications of the Labay and Richardson decisions tend to indi-
cate a retreat from the Tax Court's earlier position that it would refuse
to conjecture in matters of support.7 7 Thus, in future cases, where a parent
is unable to substantiate a class of expenditures by documented proof, he
might seek to introduce into evidence statistics bearing on amounts nor-




The strength of the present legislation lies in its effectiveness as an
administrative procedure. In the event that the non-custodial parent
provides $1200 or more support for the child and the custodial parent
disputes this, or claims she provided more support, the law now provides
that each parent is entitled to an itemized statement of the other's claim.
The result is that each parent is able to make an informed decision as to
whether to litigate or reach an agreement at the administrative level.
One weakness of the 1967 legislation has been the uncertainty sur-
rounding the level of proof required of the mother when the father has
provided over $1200 in support for the dependents. However, the recent
amendment to the regulations implementing the Labay court's interpreta-
tion of the standard of proof has resolved this ambiguity in favor of a
lower evidentiary standard. Since few persons have the time, the patience,
or the knowledge to attempt the documentation required to prove every
expenditure by "clear and convincing" evidence, the standard of "clear
preponderance" should have the effect of softening the harshness of this
provision.
75Petitioner, nevertheless, failed to prove that she had provided more for the support of
her children than her former husband despite the fact that the court allowed a portion of
her unsubstantiated figures.
7 For example, in 1969 the estimated cost of raising an urban child under a low-cost
food plan varied from $930 to $1550 depending upon the age of the child, the region in which
the family lived, and the size of the family. The cost of food varied from $210 to $500; the
cost of clothing varied from $60 to $250; the cost of housing varied from $330 to $460; the
cost of medical care averaged $60; the cost of transportation varied from $130 to $240.
AGRICULTURE RESEARCH SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, COST
OF RAISING A CHILD (1970).
'nBernard C. Rivers, 33 T.C. 935, 937-38 (1960).
7 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 346-47,
Tables 525-27 (91st ed. 1970).
